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Cybersecurity for Financial Institutions: The Integral
Role of Information Sharing in Cyber Attack
Mitigation
I. INTRODUCTION
In late 2013, a multinational gang of cybercriminals began to
execute a series of highly sophisticated attacks against more than 100
banking entities across the globe.1 These incredibly complex and
unprecedented cyber attacks, also known as Carbanak2 attacks, resulted
in cumulative losses of nearly $1 billion to banks.3 An analysis of these
incidents confirmed that Carbanak attacks primarily target financial
networks that utilize money processing services such as deposit accounts
and ATMs.4 The financial losses resulting from these continuing attacks
have been astronomical, as losses per bank have ranged from $2.5 million
to $10 million per attack.5
The Carbanak attacks illustrate an alarming methodological shift
in cybercrime, as cybercriminals are now directly targeting banks’
networks, rather than targeting end-user banking customers.6
1. See Mike Lennon, Hackers Hit 100 Banks in ‘Unprecedented’ $1 Billion Cyber
Heist: Kaspersky Lab, SEC. WEEK (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.securityweek.com/hackershit-100-banks-unprecedented-1-billion-cyber-attack-kaspersky-lab (indicating that Carbanak
attacks are still an active threat to banking entities); see also KASPERSKY LAB, CARBANAK
APT
THE
GREAT
BANK
ROBBERY,
VERSION
2.1
4
(2015),
https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf (“Most of the victims based in
the geolocation of infected IPs are located in Russia, USA, Germany, China and Ukraine.”).
2. KASPERSKY LAB, supra note 1, at 7. A Carbanak attack goes through the “backdoor”
of a system, they are designed to provide cybercriminals with remote access to infected
networks for purposes of data exfiltration and espionage. Id.
3. Konstantin Goncharov, The Great Bank Robbery: Carbanak APT, KASPERSKY LAB
BUS. (Feb. 17, 2015), https://business.kaspersky.com/the-great-bank-robbery-carbanakapt/3598/.
4. KASPERSKY LAB, supra note 1, at 4. The ATM network was also used to dispense
cash from certain ATMs at certain times where money mules were ready to collect it. Id.
5. For example, one bank lost approximately $7.3 million due to ATM fraud, and
another lost $10 million due to a successful infiltration of their online banking platform. Id.
6. KASPERSKY LAB, The Great Bank Robbery: Carbanak Cybergang Steals $1bn From
100 FIs Worldwide, [hereinafter “The Great Bank Robbery”] (Feb. 16, 2015),
http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2015/Carbanak-cybergang-steals-1-bn-USDfrom-100-financial-institutions-worldwide.
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Cybercriminals employing Carbanak attacks send spear phishing e-mails
to bank employees in order to infect systems with custom malware
containing video files that capture bank employees’ activities.7 This
surveillance feature provides attackers with an operational picture of the
banks practices that the cybercriminals later mimic to create fake
transactions to transfer money into their own accounts.8 The intelligence
gained from custom malware enables cybercriminals to remain versatile
in meticulously tailoring their attacks based on a specific bank’s
operational practices and vulnerabilities.9 Perhaps most alarming, no
matter what software the banks were using, the cybercriminals got in,
often undetected, even though all malware leaves a trace or “marker”
when it successfully infiltrates a system.10 Unfortunately, this marker
often goes unnoticed because financial institutions (“FIs”)11 have not
revamped their cybersecurity infrastructure to include monitoring
changes to their networks.12
In the face of these persistent cyber attacks, FIs must continue to
strengthen their cybersecurity infrastructure by investing resources in
gathering, analyzing, and sharing cyber threat intelligence data to better
understand the evolving nature of complex security risks. 13 Utilizing

7. KASPERSKY LAB, supra note 1, at 3, 21. In one series of attacks, the email
attachments exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office and Microsoft Word, which
decrypted and opened up the “backdoor” (remote access point) known as Carbanak. Id.
8. Id. at 21; see also The Great Bank Robbery, supra note 6 (“In other cases
cybercriminals penetrated right into the very heart of the accounting systems, inflating
account balances before pocketing the extra funds via a fraudulent transaction. For example:
if an account has 1,000 dollars, the criminals change its value so it has 10,000 dollars and then
transfer 9,000 to themselves. The account holder doesn’t suspect a problem because the
original 1,000 dollars are still there.”).
9. See KASPERSKY LAB, supra note 1, at 21.
10. Id. On average, each bank robbery took between two and four months, from
infecting the first computer at the bank’s corporate network to making off with the stolen
money. Id.
11. INVESTOPEDIA,
Definition
of
a
Financial
Institution,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialinstitution.asp (last visited Jan. 26. 2016). A
financial institution is “[a]n establishment that focuses on dealing with financial transactions,
such as investments, loans and deposits. Conventionally, FIs are composed of organizations
such as banks, trust companies, insurance companies and investment dealers.” Id.
12. See Lennon, supra note 1 (quoting Chief Technology Officer of Tripwire, Dwayane
Melancon in saying that the Carbanak attacks are a “jarring reminder of how easy it is for
even sophisticated enterprises to overlook damaging changes to their cyber infrastructure”).
13. John W. Carlson, Testimony on Behalf of the Fin. Servs. Information Sharing &
Analysis Ctr. (“FS-ISAC”) Before the U.S. House of Rep. Comm. on Fin. Servs. 12 (June 24,
2015),
https://www.fsisac.com/sites/default/files/news/JCarlson%20June%2024%20Testimony%20
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cyber intelligence analytics may aid FIs in better monitoring network
activity, resulting in more effective threat detection, mitigation, and
enhanced response strategies.14 However, on their own, FIs often lack
the resources to efficiently detect, analyze, and mitigate cyber attacks.15
Meanwhile, the federal government has a strong foreign intelligence
apparatus coupled with the cybersecurity capability to determine where
the threat or attack came from, and how to stop it.16 Therefore, proactive
collaboration may lead to better cybersecurity solutions capable of
keeping pace with the evolving nature of attacks against FIs. 17
On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed into law the
Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (the “Act”), which is designed to serve as a
powerful vehicle to facilitate a collaborative initiative premised on cyber
threat information sharing.18
The Act establishes a voluntary
cybersecurity information sharing process, and most significantly, clearly
delineates liability19 protections to private entities such as FIs that wish
to share cyber threat information with one another and the federal
government.20 Although controversial among civil liberties and privacy

FINAL.pdf.
14. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FFIEC CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT
GENERAL
OBSERVATIONS
3
(last
visited
Jan.
19,
2016),
https://www.ffiec.gov/press/PDF/FFIEC_Cybersecurity_Assessment_Observations.pdf.
15. See id. at 2 (comparing the limited position of private sector entities with the
government who is “uniquely positioned to investigate, arrest, and prosecute cybercriminals;
[and] to collect foreign intelligence on cyber threats. . .”); see also Carlson, supra note 13, at
19 (“While the financial sector is an example of a strong and frequent cyber collaboration and
investment, we cannot fight this battle alone.”).
16. See Judith H. Germano, Cybersecurity Partnerships: A New Era of Public-Private
Collaboration, THE CTR. ON L. & SEC.: NYU SCH. OF L. 2 (Oct. 2014) (concluding that “the
government can provide a more complete perspective on the threat and on effective mitigation
techniques, while taking steps to protect individual victims”).
17. See id. at 11 (A well-structured cybersecurity program requires consistent
collaboration with and information sharing between the financial sector and the federal
government.); see also FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 4, 9 (2015).
18. Cybersecurity Act of 2015, H.R. 2029, 114th Cong. (2015).
19. See Germano, supra note 16, at 8 (“Theories of liability revolve around both the
actual breach and the company’s response to the breach, including regarding the content and
timing of notice and disclosure. And exposure can be grounded in statutory, regulatory, and
common law.”).
20. ALSTON & BIRD, THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT IS NOW LAW 1–2
(Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.alston.com/Files/Publication/994c3e4b-2220-4c54-b5ca9699571d0c89/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/40260001-f03b-4c3f-a7dc9884d39de8c9/15-443-CybersecurityInformationSharingAct.pdf; CADWALADER, PRESIDENT
OBAMA SIGNS CYBERSECURITY ACT OF 2015 TO ENCOURAGE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION
SHARING (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friendsmemos/president-obama-signs-cybersecurity-act-of-2015-to-encourage-cybersecurity-
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advocates, the Act is a positive and much needed step in furtherance of a
joint solution to modern cyber warfare.21 President Obama further
demonstrated the critical need to strengthen the nation’s cybersecurity
infrastructure through a $19 billion allocation for cybersecurity initiatives
in the fiscal 2017 budget.22 The budget follows with instruction from
President Obama directing his administration to implement a
Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP).23 CNAP’s initiatives
“place[] significant focus on the private sector’s role in securing the
nation’s cyber borders,” and also mirrors the voluntary nature of the
Act.24
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II details FIs’ stake in cyber
warfare.25 Part III highlights the importance of cyber risk assessments
and the critical role cyber intelligence and collaboration play in threat
detection and response.26 Part IV discusses the collaborative imperative
between the financial sector and the federal government, and the
significance of recently passed cyber legislation that addresses
information sharing practices.27 Finally, Part V concludes by reiterating
the pressing need for FIs to take a larger role in cyber risk mitigation.28

information-sharing.
21. White House Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: Cybersecurity National
Action Plan (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/factsheet-cybersecurity-national-action-plan; Russell Brandom, Congress Passes Controversial
Cybersecurity Bill Attached to Omnibus Budget, THE VERGE (Dec. 18, 2015, 12:08 PM),
http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/18/10582446/congress-passes-cisa-surveillancecybersecurity.
22. Allison Grande, Obama Budgets $19B To Take Action Against Cyberattacks,
LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2016, 8:44 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/756881/obama-budgets19b-to-take-action-against-cyberattacks (noting this budget is a 35% “increase over the $14
billion that the president requested from Congress for these efforts for the 2016 fiscal year”).
23. White House Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 21.
24. See Evan D. Wolff et al., Highlights of Obama’s Ambitious New Cybersecurity Plan,
LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2016, 5:47 PM) http://wwww.law360.com/articles/757763/highlights-ofobama-s-ambitious-new-cybersecurity-plan (noting the cybersecurity initiatives “draw
heavily on the private sector’s experience with cyber resilience and an enterprise-wide,
multiyear approach to cybersecurity” and “does not impose cybersecurity obligations on the
private sector”).
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part V.
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II. FIS’ STAKE IN CYBER WARFARE
The Carbanak attacks demonstrate the very real and growing
threat of cyber attacks on FIs.29 Over the past decade, the networks of
our nation’s critical infrastructure have converged to create a digitized
cyberspace that has transformed the way business is transacted across the
globe.30 Our information travels throughout this interdependent network
of information technology infrastructures, and unfortunately it does not
travel alone.31 Cybercriminals, terrorists, and our adversaries launch
cyber attacks through this interdependent network, leaving our nation’s
financial system and other critical infrastructures vulnerable to
significant risk and potential destruction.32
A.

The Cost of Cyber Warfare

Cyber attacks may significantly damage and disrupt the financial
sector, requiring institutions to develop robust cybersecurity programs
tailored to their individual needs.33 Given the constantly evolving nature
of these attacks, FIs must learn to adapt to new, emerging threats. 34 The
price tag on any single cyber attack varies dramatically based on the
interplay of a number of factors such as the type, frequency, and duration
of the attack.35

29. Goncharov, supra note 3; see also Kevin L. Petrasic, A Cybersecurity Catch-22 For
Banks, LAW360 (May 13, 2015, 10:25 AM) http://www.law360.com/articles/654392/acybersecurity-catch-22-for-banks (discussing “the increase in the number and sophistication
of cyber attacks [that] [have] alarmed bank regulators and law enforcement officials”).
30. General Keith Alexander, Address at AFCEA Conference at 5–6 (June 28, 2013).
At the time of the address, General Alexander was the Director of the National Security
Agency and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command. Id. see also White House Office of the
Press Secretary, supra note 21.
31. General Keith Alexander, supra note 30, at 5–6.
32. See id. at 6; see also White House Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 21
(“Criminals, terrorists, and countries who wish to do us harm have all realized that attacking
us online is often easier than attacking us in person.”); Carlson, supra note 13, at 10 (“Many
cybersecurity incidents, regardless of their original motive, have the potential to disrupt
critical systems.”).
33. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Remarks of Deputy Secretary Raskin at
the Texas Bankers’ Association Executive Leadership Cybersecurity Conference (Dec. 3,
2014), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9711.aspx (“Banks
should have risk management frameworks that are appropriately tailored to the cyber risks
presented by their specific businesses and operations.”).
34. Id.
35. PONEMON INST., 2015 COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: UNITED STATES at 12–14
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In cyber warfare, time is money.36 The longer it takes to detect,
mitigate, and fully resolve a cyber attack, the more costly it becomes. 37
According to a recent cybercrime study conducted by the Ponemon
Institute,38 participating organizations39 spent the most on threat detection
and recovery measures, which totaled over half of their annualized costs
associated with cyber attacks.40 Organizations that utilize security
intelligence technologies reported having significantly lower costs than
organizations that did not employ them.41 The marginal difference
between these entities is most prevalent in the detection phase, with
nearly a $2 million increase in the annualized budget of organizations that
do not deploy security intelligence technologies.42 Despite the resources
devoted to cybersecurity, running a successful cybersecurity program
remains a challenge for many FIs.43
B.

Budgeting for Defense

Due to the severe consequences associated with successful cyber
attacks, FIs are increasingly willing to invest more in cybersecurity. 44
According to a report published by Homeland Security Research
Corporation, the 2015 U.S. financial services cybersecurity market will
reach $9.5 billon, which makes it the largest non-government
cybersecurity market.45 Branch Banking & Trust (“BB&T”), which has
(2015), http://www.ponemon.org/library/2015-cost-of-cyber-crime-united-states.
36. See id. at 4 (indicating a positive relationship between the time to contain an attack
and organizational cost).
37. Id.
38. PONEMON INST., http://www.ponemon.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). The Ponemon
Institute engages in private research on privacy, data protection, and information security in
order to enable organizations to better protect their data and enhance their security practices.
Id.
39. PONEMON INST., supra note 35, at 27. Financial service entities represented 17% of
the study’s sample size. Id.
40. Id. at 17. The average time to resolve a cyber attack was 46 days, with an average
cost to participating organizations of $1,988,554 during this 46-day period. Id.
41. Id. at 19.
42. Id.
43. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 33 (“We have learned from
these attacks, that the prevalence of cyber risk creates a persistent and complex challenge for
FIs spanning the sector, including FIs of all types and all sizes.”).
44. See PWC, TURNAROUND AND TRANSFORMATION IN CYBERSECURITY: FINANCIAL
SERVICES 19 (2015), http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cyber-security/information-securitysurvey/download.html (noting average information security spending is up 24%).
45. PRWeb, U.S. Banking & Financial Services Cybersecurity Market to Reach $9.5
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$186.8 billion in assets, doubled its cybersecurity budget in the last
several years.46 Similarly, Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan
indicated that his company will spend approximately $400 million on
cybersecurity in 2015.47 Moynihan also disclosed that cybersecurity is
the only unrestricted budget item within his company, reinforcing the
notion that as cybersecurity constantly evolves, FIs must invest more to
protect themselves, their networks, and their customers from cyber
attack.48
C.

Cyber Attacks Targeting the Financial Sector Continue to
Increase in Volume and Sophistication

When famous bank robber Willie Sutton was asked why he
robbed banks, he famously replied, “because that’s where the money
is.”49 Cybercriminals operate on the same wavelength; the volume of
cyber attacks against FIs is three times that of any other industry. 50 The
financial sector is thus inherently susceptible to cyber attacks given that
banks and other FIs are quite lucrative targets to hackers.51 Additionally,
operative features employed by FIs, such as mobile banking and ATMs,
increase their cyber threat vulnerability. 52 The increasing volume of
threats affects all institutions regardless of size or type, and the malicious
cyber actors vary considerably in terms of their internal motivation for
the attack.53
Billion by 2015 Following an Unprecedented Annual Hike of 23% (Nov. 13, 2014),
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2014/11/prweb12313135.htm.
46. Tracy Kitten, BB&T CEO Making Security a Priority, BANKING INFO SECURITY (May
5, 2015), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/interviews/bbt-ceo-on-making-security-priorityi-2688.
47. Adam O’Daniel, Moynihan: BofA’s Cyber Security Given Unlimited Budget ‘To
Keep
Us
Safe’,
CHARLOTTE
BUS.
J.
(Jan.
21,
2015),
http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/blog/bank_notes/2015/01/moynihan-bofas-cybersecurity-given-unlimited.html.
48. Id.
49. Carlson, supra note 13, at 11 (attributing the original quote to Sutton while noting
that it is limited in its purpose for explaining why FIs are vulnerable to cyber threats given
that the “quote does not capture the entirety of the situation we face today” as “FIs are [also]
being targeted in response to international conflicts”).
50. WEBSENSE SEC. LABS, 2015 INDUSTRY DRILL-DOWN REPORT FINANCIAL SERVICES 4
(2015),
https://www.websense.com/content/2015-finance-industrydrilldown.aspx?intcmp=nav-mm-resources-finance-drill-down-report.
51. Id.
52. See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 1–2.
53. Carlson, supra note 13, at 11.
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In addition to the significant increase in cyber attacks against the
financial sector, these attacks are becoming more intricate and
sophisticated.54 Most FIs indicate that the greatest challenge to building
an adequate cybersecurity program arises from the evolving nature and
complexity of cyber threats, rather than budget restrictions.55
Cybercriminals are focusing on targeted attacks that are
specifically tailored to individual FIs. 56 Targeted attacks theoretically
carry more potential to damage the financial sector than “untargeted
attacks,” because they are generally more successful and harder to protect
against.57 In addition to the aforementioned Carbanak attacks, two
common examples of targeted cyber attacks are spear-phishing
campaigns and distributed denial-of-service attacks (“DDoS”).58 Spearphishing campaigns appear to employees as seemingly legitimate e-mails
that trick users into supplying sensitive information such as passwords
that compromise the integrity of the network.59 DDoS attacks impede
access to banking services for extended periods of time by overwhelming
web-based applications with voluminous, malicious network traffic
designed to cause applications to shut down.60 These attacks may also
function as a diversion to draw attention away from simultaneous, but
separate cyber attacks designed to steal customer account and proprietary
information from the FIs network.61
In 2012 and early 2013, ten major U.S. banks fell victim to DDoS
54. Petrasic, supra note 29.
55. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., REPORT ON CYBER SECURITY IN THE BANKING

SECTOR 10 (2014), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr140505_cyber_security.pdf
(“The barriers to ensuring information security most cited by institutions were the increasing
sophistication of threats (71%) and emerging technologies (53%).”).
56. Petrasic, supra note 29.
57. See id. (distinguishing targeted attacks from untargeted attacks, as the former are
specifically tailored to a single bank, and the latter is usually a mass wave designed to hit as
many devices, users and services as possible).
58. Id.
59. Carlson, supra note 13, at 10.
60. Tracy Kitten, DDoS Attacks: 2013 Forecast, BANK INFO SEC. (Dec. 30, 2012),
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/ddos-attacks-2013-outlook-a-5396/op-1;
see
also
Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Cybersecurity 101: A Resource Guide for Bank
Executives,
CSBS
BLOG
18
(2014),
https://www.csbs.org/CyberSecurity/blog/Pages/default.aspx (“Banks subject to a DDoS
attack may face a variety of risks, including operational risks and reputation risks. The attack
may also serve as a distraction while hackers attempt alternative types of fraud.”).
61. Kitten, supra note 60 (referencing an alert issued by the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency on Dec. 21, 2012 “about the recent wave of DDoS attacks, noting that financial
institutions had linked DDoS to fraud and the theft of proprietary information”).
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attacks, resulting in millions of dollars in losses.62 The DDoS attacks not
only illustrated the detrimental effect of successful cyber attacks on the
financial sector, but they also sparked collaboration between the private
and public sector to share information that fruitfully aided in mitigating
active cyber attacks.63
III. STEPS TO IMPLEMENT AN EFFECTIVE CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK
The financial sector cannot single handedly defend against the
complex and constantly evolving threat of cyber attacks.64 The start of a
solution to mitigate and prevent cyber attacks requires a collaborative,
proactive relationship premised on information sharing between the
government and private sector.65 Although critical, information sharing
is but one facet of cybersecurity.66 Additional action is required by FIs
in order to counter, prevent, and mitigate cyber attacks.67
Various financial service regulators have published best practices
for FIs to consider when creating and modifying their individual
cybersecurity programs.68 Additionally, New York’s top financial
regulator, the Department of Financial Services, announced a plan to
implement mandatory cybersecurity requirements for banks to complete
“mandatory annual audits, enhance identity authentication for key data
bases”, and appoint a “single executive charged with managing their

62. Id.; see also Germano, supra note 16, at 11.
63. See Carlson, supra note 13, at 11 (“The DDoS attack also catapulted the

cybersecurity issue to a CEO level across the entire financial services sector for the first time.
When the CEOs of [FS-ISAC] member financial services companies engaged directly it
resulted in even greater collaboration among the financial associations and government
agencies.”).
64. See Germano, supra note 16, at 1 (“Ultimately, the short answer is that no single
actor (or group of actors) can figure it out alone.”).
65. See id. at 1–2 (“A strategic cybersecurity solution mandates the combined resources
and coordination of government and industry, within a practical framework that balances
effectiveness with efficiency, and security with privacy and innovation.”).
66. ERIC A. FISCHER & STEPHANIE M. LOGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43996,
CYBERSECURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING: COMPARISON OF H.R. 1560 AND H.R. 1731 4
(2015).
67. Id. at 4–5.
68. KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, CYBER-ATTACKS: THREATS, REGULATORY
REACTION AND PRACTICAL PROACTIVE MEASURES TO HELP AVOID RISKS (Jun. 24, 2015),
https://www.kattenlaw.com/Cyber-Attacks-Threats-Regulatory-Reaction-and-PracticalProactive-Measures-to-Help-Avoid-Risks. For example, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), Commodities Future Trading Commission, and the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority all have best published practices. Id.
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information security.”69 While there is no “silver-bullet” solution, or a
universal approach to defend against the vast array of cyber attacks,
cybersecurity programs based on a holistic view of technology,
operational practices, and cyber threat intelligence will prove most
efficient in tackling the cyber threats that carry the most destructive
potential.70
The Pareto Principle (“80/20 rule”) reflects the notion that
approximately 80% of effects originate from only 20% of causes.71 The
80/20 rule provides sound guidance on how FIs should individually
approach cybersecurity protection measures.72 Given that not all cyber
attacks create the same level of risk, resources should be prioritized to
defend against attacks that compose the critical 20% of incidents.73
Further, no two FIs are the same, and thus, cybersecurity program
decisions must be based on a particular institution’s unique assets and
characteristics.74 An assessment of an FI’s inherent risk and cyber
incident response program is a highly informative first step to developing
an effective cybersecurity program, and identifying the 20% of causes
that pose the greatest risk.75
A.

Cybersecurity Risk Assessment: The Discovery Phase

The discovery phase requires a baseline examination of a
particular FI’s inherent cybersecurity risk, which incorporates the type,
volume, and complexity of operational features utilized by the

69. Evan Weinberger, NY Outlines Coming Bank, Insurer Cybersecurity Rules, LAW360
(Nov. 10, 2015, 12:51 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/725482/ny-outlines-comingbank-insurer-cybersecurity-rules.
70. See Germano, supra note 16, at 14; see also Mark Clancy, Applying the 80/20 Rule
to Cyber Security Practices, INFORMATIONWEEK DARK READING (Aug. 19, 2015),
http://www.darkreading.com/perimeter/applying-the-80-20-rule-to-cyber-securitypractices/a/d-id/1321818.
71. See Clancy, supra note 70.
72. Id.
73. Id. (noting that this critical 20% of incidents will differ depending on a specific FIs
characteristics and operational practices).
74. See id. (“Unfortunately, we continue to see too many instances where firms take a
‘one-size fits all’ approach to their cyber defenses, focusing too many resources on lowerlevel risks, such as wide-scale malware campaigns, and not enough on the most destructive
attacks.”).
75. Id. Significant financial resources are often drained when cybercriminals strike, as
hefty costs are incurred in the discovery, analysis, mitigation and closure phases of a cyber
attack. Id.
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institution.76 On June 30, 2015, the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (“FFIEC”)77 launched a comprehensive
Cybersecurity Assessment Tool78 (“Assessment”) to help FIs identify
their inherent risks and assess their cybersecurity preparedness.79 The
Assessment serves as a tool for FIs of all sizes to understand their unique
cybersecurity risks, especially when introducing new products, services,
or initiatives.80
Whether or not the Assessment is mandatory for FIs has been
discussed among examiners, bankers, and experts in the financial
sector.81 The conclusion is that legally the Assessment is not mandatory,
but it may be necessary as a practical matter.82 Looking collectively at
the supplemental announcements of the Federal Reserve Board (“the
Fed”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Assessment will at
least be discussed, if not used in the regulators’ next examination cycle
for FIs.83 The OCC and the Fed have been the most explicit in their
intention to incorporate the Assessment into their examinations—by late
2015 for the OCC and by early 2016 for the Fed.84 The FDIC, however,
maintains that the Assessment is voluntary, but will be discussed by FDIC

76. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 14.
77. Regulatory
Agencies,
FED.
FIN.
INSTS.
EXAMINATION

COUNCIL,
https://ffiec.gov/agencies.htm. The FFIEC consists of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union
Administration, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau. Id.
78. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, OVERVIEW FOR CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
AND
BOARDS
OF
DIRECTORS
(Jun.
2015),
https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/cybersecurity/FFIEC_CAT_CEO_Board_Overview_June_2015_
PDF1.pdf [hereinafter “FFIEC OVERVIEW FOR CEOS AND BOD”]. The Assessment functions
as two parts, the inherent risk profile and the cybersecurity maturity assessment. Intertwined
in the inherent risk profile assessment are both internal and external concerns that take into
account the risks posed by FIs connection types, products, services and technologies used by
examining the type, volume and complexity of these operational features. On the other hand,
the maturity assessment focuses more specifically on an institution’s response and recovery
ability by looking at specific controls and practices that are in place. Id.
79. Id. at 1; Press Release, Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Releases Cybersecurity
Assessment Tool (Jun. 30, 2015), https://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr063015.htm
80. FFIEC OVERVIEW FOR CEOS AND BOD, supra note 78, at 4.
81. See Chad Knutson, Is the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool Required? SECURE
BANKING
SOL.
(2015),
https://www.protectmybank.com/is-the-ffiec-cybersecurityassessment-tool-required/.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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examiners with institution management during the examination.85 An
adverse score on cybersecurity measures will affect the management
(“M”) column of a banks CAMELS86 rating, as failure to conduct the
Assessment may send a negative message regarding an FI’s ability or
willingness to manage cyber risks.87
As a practical matter, the Assessment advances FIs’ interest in
network and data protection by incorporating cybersecurity-related
principles from regulatory guidance to identify areas in their security
plans and response programs that may need improvement.88 The
Assessment also reflects the notion that cybersecurity should be viewed
as an element of an FI’s overall risk management strategy, rather than as
an independent subset of the IT department.89 This shift in cybersecurity
focus to management and board oversight helps set a strong
interconnected cybersecurity culture from the top down.90
1. Cybersecurity Inherent Risk: Connection Types & Mobile Banking
FIs are inherently susceptible to cyber attacks due to their use of
certain operative features that contribute to their vulnerability. 91 In
particular, the risks accompanying the use of third-party and cloud
vendors, as well as the dangers associated with mobile banking
applications and ATMs, puts a bulls-eye on the networks of FIs of all

85. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FINANCIAL INSTITUTION LETTERS: CYBERSECURITY
ASSESSMENT TOOL (July 2, 2015).
86. See generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP, 5000 – STATEMENTS OF POLICY, UNIFORM
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS RATING SYSTEM (1996) (explaining the CAMELS rating system).
87. Knutson, supra note 81.
88. See Alan Deer & Brad Neighbors, Assessing Your Cybersecurity Preparedness: It
May Be Time to Update Your Bank’s Information Security and Response Program, JB SUPRE
BUS. ADVISOR (July 2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/balch-bingham-financialupdate-july-57357/.
89. See Judy A. Selby & Jonathan A. Forman, C for Cybersecurity: There’s a New
Meaning To “C-Suite” As Cybersecurity Is Not Just An IT Risk, LEGAL TECH NEWS (Jun. 5,
2015),
http://www.legaltechnews.com/id=1202728196571/C-Is-forCybersecurity?slreturn=20160020134828 (“Regulators have made clear that cybersecurity is
now a C-suite issue.”).
90. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 1–2.
91. See id. at 1 (“Cybersecurity inherent risk is the amount of risk posed by a financial
institution’s activities and connections, notwithstanding risk-mitigating controls in place. A
financial institutions cybersecurity inherent risk incorporates the type, volume, and
complexity of operational considerations, such as connection types, products and services
offered, and technologies used.”).
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sizes.92 Additionally, the numerous connection types and access points
may contribute to FI’s inherent risk.93 Each operative feature employed
by an FI to carry out banking services may impose a unique cybersecurity
risk to an institution given that cyber hackers tend to develop specially
tailored techniques to target specific products, services, and technologies
used such as core systems, ATMs, and mobile applications.94
FIs use a variety of connection types and access points and each
presents a potential entry point for cyber attackers. 95 Failure to take
proactive measures to protect these entry points may lead to undetected
exposure to malware or other types of attacks.96 In order to prevent entry
point cyber attacks, all devices used by employees to access the
institution’s network should have the appropriate anti-virus and antimalware protections in place.97 Additionally, routine network scans for
unauthorized devices and malware are highly encouraged to better detect
and mitigate cyber attacks.98
Customer use of mobile banking has increased substantially in
recent years.99 With greater convenience comes greater security concerns
as mobile banking has created a new entry point for cyber attackers.100
Customers engaged in mobile banking do so with security settings of their
choosing, but the baseline of such settings is still at the discretion of the
institution.101 FIs that only require minimal security settings may

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 2–4.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 1.
Id.
See id. at 3 (“Most financial institutions have tools in place, such as anti-virus and
anti-malware tools, to detect previously identified attacks.”).
98. See id. (“[FIs] institutions should routinely scan IT networks for vulnerabilities and
anomalous activity, test systems for their potential exposure to cyber attacks, and remediate
issues when identified.”).
99. Conference of State Bank Supervisors, supra note 60. By 2016, an estimated 96
million U.S. consumers will adopt mobile banking to conduct financial transactions. Id.
100. See id. (“Mobile banking has opened a new door for cybercriminals and the
ecosystem of mobile banking involves several players, which can be challenging when
addressing issues of security.”).
101. See Jerome F. Combs, Mobile Banking Risk Identification and Mitigation, CMTY.
BANK
CONNECTIONS
(2014),
https://www.communitybankingconnections.org/articles/2014/q1/mobile-banking-riskidentification-and-mitigation (“Providing consumers with the ability to transact banking
business using a mobile device — with security settings of the customer’s choosing — places
an increasing amount of control over sensitive financial data into consumers’ hands.”).
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increase the risks of mobile-banking.102 Accordingly, increased security
technology that surpasses basic username and password sign-in, known
as “multi-factor authentication,” (“MFA”)103 is in the works for many
companies such as Intel, American Express, and MasterCard.104 The
primary goal of MFA is to make it more difficult for hackers to penetrate
a network or database by building a layered defense.105 President Obama
has even called upon his administration to “kick off a public awareness
campaign and work in coordination with technology and financial
services companies to make MFA technology accessible and to help
individual Americans understand their role in protecting the nation’s
cybersecurity.”106
Some suggest replacing passwords altogether with biometric data
such as fingerprints, iris scans, and voice recognition to verify a mobile
banking user’s identity when logging in.107 The launch of the iPhone 6s
also presents a new way to secure mobile banking through its 3D touch
and improved camera features.108 Mobile banking is constantly evolving
102. See id. (“The net loss of control over information makes it more difficult for the bank
to assess risks and implement effective risk mitigation strategies.”).
103. Margaret Rouse, Multifactor Authentication (MFA) Definition, TECH TARGET (last
visited Jan. 20, 2015), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/multifactorauthentication-MFA (MFA “is a security system that requires more than one method of
authentication from independent categories of credentials to verify the user’s identity for a
login or other transaction. [MFA] combines two or more independent credentials: what the
user knows (password), what the user has (security token) and what the user is (biometric
verification).”).
104. See White House Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: White House Summit
on
Cybersecurity
and
Consumer
Protection
(Feb.
13,
2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/fact-sheet-white-house-summitcybersecurity-and-consumer-protection; see also PwC, supra note 44, at 8 (“Banks, in
particular, are moving away from traditional passwords for both clients and employees.”).
105. See PWC, supra note 44, at 8 (discussing multiple benefits of advanced
authentication, such as improved customer/business partner confidence in security and
privacy, enhanced/reduced fraud protection, more secure online transactions, improved
customer experience, and improved regulatory compliance).
106. Wolff, et al., supra note 24; see also White House Office of the Press Secretary,
supra note 21 (“The President is calling on Americans to move beyond just the password to
leverage multiple factors of authentication when logging-in to online accounts.”).
107. See Sandeep Sood, Passwords Are Dead: Biometrics and The Future of Banking
Security, THE FIN. BRAND (Feb. 3, 2015), http://thefinancialbrand.com/49952/biometricsmobile-banking-security/; see also PwC, supra note 44, at 8 (noting an example of how
biometrics enabled a Texas based financial services and insurance firm to enhance security
and customer service, while improving the ease of use for mobile banking customers).
108. Jim Marous, iPhone 6s Provides Opportunity for Banking, THE FIN. BRAND (Sept.
11, 2015), http://thefinancialbrand.com/53943/iphone-6s-banking-opportunity/. The iPhone
6s’s improved FaceTime camera may be utilized for facial recognition in improved identity
verification processes on mobile banking applications, as well as to enhance mobile check
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as technology becomes more innovative, and therefore FIs’ cybersecurity
posture must also evolve with innovation.109
2. External Dependency Management: Third-Party Vendors
FIs depend on numerous third-party vendors to carry out critical
banking functions.110 Reliance on third-party vendors is a continuing
challenge as it frustrates cybersecurity solutions across the financial
sector.111 Improper controls over a third-party vendor’s handling of
sensitive consumer data may result in successful cyber attacks that expose
the FI’s network and thus, consumer data.112 Such lack of control over
third-parties essentially wastes any resources invested in cybersecurity
protection by the FI.113 In order to prevent wasting resources invested in
cybersecurity protection, FIs should consider increasing spending and
allocation towards addressing third-party security concerns.114
Financial regulators have also made it clear that FIs cannot evade
liability for damages that result from inadequate cybersecurity controls
of third-party vendors.115 Therefore, if third-party vendors are left
unregulated, their lack of security measures can tremendously weaken the
cybersecurity infrastructure of an FI, which may lead to astronomical
losses for FIs that are left responsible for the resulting damage.116

deposit practices. Id.
109. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors, supra note 60 (“As technology continues
to advance and rapidly change, it is critical that all [FIs], regardless of size, constantly assess
their cybersecurity preparedness and review their technology infrastructure for
vulnerabilities.”).
110. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., UPDATE ON CYBER SECURITY IN THE BANKING
SECTOR: THIRD PARTY SERVICE PROVIDERS 3 (2014) (noting examples of high-risk third-party
vendors utilized by FIs, such as “check/payment processors, trading and settlement
operations, and data processing companies”).
111. Id. at 2.
112. INDEP. CMTY. BANKERS OF AM., CYBERSECURITY: THE COMMUNITY BANK
PERSPECTIVE
1–2
(May
19,
2015),
http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/test051915.pdf.
113. See id. (“Securing financial data at [FIs] is of limited value if it remains exposed at
the point-of-sale and other processing points.”).
114. Id.
115. See KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, supra note 68 (noting the importance for
firms to conduct vendor due diligence given that “financial regulators are making it
increasingly clear that financial services firms will be liable for cyber-attacks as a result of
improper controls at third-party service providers”).
116. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., supra note 110, at 6 (“47% of the surveyed
institutions reported having cyber insurance policies that explicitly cover information security
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Management of this particular facet of external dependencies
requires FIs of all sizes to establish rigorous vendor management controls
guided by a clear delineation of the third parties’ responsibilities.117 FIs
should adopt risk management processes that align the complexity of
their relationship with third-party vendors that ensures comprehensive
risk management and oversight of their critical activities.118 A crucial
component of such an agreement requires the third-party to notify the
parent FI if a data breach or cyber attack comprises their or their
subcontractor’s network.119 Accordingly, third-party vendor contracts
should require notification if they intend to use subcontractors, and
include further specifications and limitations on such use.120
Contracts between third-party vendors and FIs should also clearly
define the parties’ respective duties and liability in the event of a
successful cyber attack.121 Strict agreements that impose financial
responsibility on third-party vendors who fail to take adequate security
precautions may serve as a strong incentive for them to implement
effective security measures.122 Also, a detailed contractual agreement
may demonstrate that an FI exercised due care, thus decreasing the
likelihood it will face penalties for potential civil or regulatory liability. 123
The financial industry has started to take action to address risks imposed
by third-party vendors, but this progress is far from uniform and tends to
vary based upon the size and type of institution.124
failures by a third-party vendor.”). The results discussed in the update are based on the
responses of 40 state regulated banking organizations in New York. Id. at 2.
117. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Third-Party Relationships: Risk
Management Guidance, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2013/bulletin-2013-29.html.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. (FIs may also want to “[r]eserve the right to terminate the contract without
penalty if the third party’s subcontracting arrangements do not comply with the terms of the
contract.”).
121. Id.
122. See INDEP. CMTY. BANKERS OF AM, supra note 112 (“Allocating financial
responsibility with the party that is best positioned to secure consumer data will provide a
strong incentive for it to do so effectively.”).
123. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 117 (“Developing a
contract that clearly defines expectations and responsibilities of the third party helps to ensure
the contract’s enforceability, limit the bank’s liability, and mitigate disputes about
performance.”); see also KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, supra note 68 (noting the
importance for firms to conduct vendor due diligence).
124. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., supra note 110, at 2. Larger to midsize financial
firms are more likely than small firms to require a pre-contract or periodic on-site assessment
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3. Cybersecurity Management and Staff Training
Clear delegation of cybersecurity management oversight
responsibilities to a specific senior employee can strengthen
cybersecurity programs because it holds a single person accountable for
lapses in oversight or implementation of the FI’s cybersecurity
policies.125 Inadequate security awareness among employees has been
documented as one of the greatest inhibitors to an effective cybersecurity
posture.126 Therefore, management should also focus on educating
employees through exercises that animate various types of cyber threats
and associated complications.127
Utilization of cyber simulations has been noted as one extremely
effective measure to facilitate a comprehensive and effective cyber
response program.128 A cyber incident simulation requires the IT security
team to create a simulated attack to which the staff responds by working
through their incident response procedure—this provides critical insight
into any weaknesses in the program that need strengthening.129
Additionally, such exercises may allow the IT team, management, and
other personnel to individually understand their respective role in the
event of a successful cyber attack.130 An understanding of their role may
accordingly reduce the damage caused by the attack through more
efficient and educated threat mitigation responses.131

of high risk third-party vendors, and smaller firms are also significantly less likely to require
third-party vendors to impose minimum information security requirements on subcontractors.
Id. at 3.
125. KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, supra note 68.
126. WEBSENSE SEC. LABS, supra note 50.
127. Kitten, supra note 46.
128. Id. Kelly King, CEO of BB&T, declared in an interview that cybersecurity training,
such as cyber attack simulations play a vital role at his company. Id.
129. See id. (Kelly King, CEO of BB&T, expressly endorsed the exercise, referring to it
as “an extremely eye-opening process” that he considers “one of the best things [he] [has]
done at BB&T.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 33 (“These
exercises allow CEOs, directors, and other key players to figure out how they will navigate
the pressures and problems that come from the intrusion.”).
130. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 33.
131. Id.
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Cyber Threat Intelligence and Collaboration: The Analysis
Phase

The analysis phase of cybersecurity programs hinges on threat
intelligence132 and collaboration that seeks to speed up incident detection,
response, and mitigation.133 Cyber incident analysis requires institutions
to gather, monitor, evaluate, and share information in order to identify
and prevent cyber threats in the industry. 134 The necessity of this phase
has begun to leverage collaborative industry utilities, such as the
Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (“FSISAC”), that share threat information and remediation tactics across the
financial sector.135
The FS-ISAC is the financial sector’s primary resource for cyber
threat information analysis and sharing.136 Over the past decade,
participation in FS-ISAC has grown exponentially from sixty members
in 2004 to over 6,000 members as of 2015.137 The FS-ISAC offers a wide
range of information sharing capabilities designed to provide members
with actionable threat information to better detect and mitigate cyber
attacks.138 In order to quickly disseminate information throughout the
financial sector, the FS-ISAC utilizes Soltra-Edge, an industry-driven
threat intelligence sharing platform designed to decrease the time of
detection and mitigation from weeks and days to hours and minutes.139
Soltra-Edge is the product of a joint venture between FS-ISAC and
132. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 3. The FFIEC defines
threat intelligence as “the acquisition and analysis of information to identify, track, and predict
cyber capabilities, intentions and activities that offer courses of action to enhance decision
making.” Id.
133. Clancy, supra note 70.
134. See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 3.
135. Clancy, supra note 69; see also FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note
14, at 3.
136. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 33.
137. See Carlson, supra note 13, at 2 (identifying member organizations to include
“commercial banks and credit unions of all sizes, markets and equities firms, brokerage firms,
insurance companies, payments processors, and 40 trade associations representing all of the
U.S. financial services sector”).
138. FIN. SERV. INFO. SHARING AND ANALYSIS CTR., About FS-ISAC (2015),
https://www.fsisac.com/about; see also Carlson, supra note 13, at 2 (“The FS-ISAC’s goals
are to disseminate and foster the sharing of relevant and actionable information and analysis
among participants to ensure the continued public confidence in the global financial services
and to protect the financial services sector against cyber and physical threats, vulnerabilities,
and risk.”).
139. Id. at 8.
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Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation to develop a fully automated
cyber threat information sharing process.140
This information sharing platform leverages deep cybersecurity
expertise from the financial industry. 141 FS-ISAC works closely on risk
mitigation strategies with the U.S. Treasury Department, financial
regulators, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and other
government and law enforcement agencies.142
This ongoing
collaboration is set in place to respond to changing threats and seeks to
build on the strong risk management culture within the financial
industry.143 FS-ISAC also conducts “joint exercises to test its
communications, response and resiliency protocols during incident
scenarios affecting different segments of the financial system.”144
C. The Value of Information Sharing
The private sector can benefit from valuable information
collected and analyzed by the government by integrating that information
into effective risk controls and cybersecurity management to better
mitigate and detect cyber attacks.145 FS-ISAC has picked up on this
notion and has accordingly worked closely with government agencies to
obtain security clearances for key financial services sector personnel that
have been utilized to brief the sector on developing security threats and
information.146 Furthermore, the cost of sharing information is relatively
small, and the benefits can be quite rewarding.147

140. Press Release, Fin. Servs. Info. Sharing and Analysis Ctr., Soltra Edge, The First
Industry Driven Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform Now Generally Available, Easy to Use
and
Free
to
License
(Dec.
3,
2014),
https://www.fsisac.com/sites/default/files/news/FINAL2%20Soltra%20Edge%20GA%20pre
ss%20release_12%203%2014WEB2.pdf.
141. Id.
142. Carlson, supra note 13, at 12.
143. See id. (noting also that these collaborative efforts are performed “in conjunction
with extensive regulatory requirements”).
144. Id. at 4.
145. N. ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43821, LEGISLATION TO FACILITATE
CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1, 5 (2015).
146. Carlson, supra note 13, at 8 (“These clearances have been used to brief the sector on
new information security threats and have provided valuable information for the sector to
implement effective risk controls to combat these threats.”)
147. See WEISS, supra note 145, at 4 (noting that despite the cost reducing benefit of
information sharing, “a review of recent data breaches shows that most of the details about
breaches are released by third party experts, not the firms involved”); see also Clancy, supra
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The success of such collaboration in mitigating cyber threats is
illustrated by the combined response to the 2012 DDoS attacks on
American banks.148 At the time of the attacks, representatives from Wells
Fargo, PNC Financial Corp., and U.S. Bank affirmed they had
cybersecurity strategies in place to fend off DDoS attacks, but these
attacks were simply unprecedented in terms of the volume of traffic that
was used to bombard the online banking systems to a point of
disruption.149 As FIs were scrambling to mitigate the voluminous and
destructive threats, banks began to share information with other FIs and
the federal government at an unprecedented level.150 The increased
information sharing proved extremely beneficial to FIs that were later
targeted on the second, third and fourth wave of DDoS attacks.151 FIs
later attacked were able to utilize threat intelligence information from the
initial attack to detect and more quickly mitigate subsequent DDoS
attacks.152 The faster recovery and mitigation by FIs attacked in the latter
waves illustrates the value of collaboration and information sharing on a
more proactive basis, rather than waiting for crisis mode to strike.153
Despite the incident response and mitigation benefits illustrated
above, FIs that have been hit by a cyber attack still often hesitate to share,
analyze or discuss information regarding the attack.154 Such insular
thinking leaves other FIs vulnerable to the same attack, and only further
frustrates cybersecurity solutions.155 A major premise of the FS-ISAC is

note 70 (“Collaborative cyber security threat information tools will not only enable firms to
identify incidents more quickly, but at their best, should also empower them to either
proactively prevent issues or mitigate them quickly.”).
148. Germano, supra note 16, at 11–12.
149. Nicole Perlroth, In Cyberattacks on Banks, Evidence of a New Weapon, NY TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/in-cyberattacks-on-banks-evidenceof-a-new-weapon/?_r=0; see also Germano, supra note 16, at 11 (“At the peak of those DDoS
attacks, U.S. banks were grappling with
electronic traffic of up to 120 gigabytes per second—at least three times the volume of traffic
most large bank websites were equipped to handle at the time—and banks were spending tens
of millions of dollars to mitigate the problem.”).
150. Carlson, supra note 13, at 11.
151. Id.
152. Not only did the DDoS attacks ignite a wave of information sharing, but it also for
the first time launched the issue of cybersecurity to a CEO level across the financial sector.
Id.
153. Germano, supra note 16, at 2–8.
154. WEISS, supra note 145, at 4–5 (discussing perceived legal barriers to information
sharing and economic incentives to not share information about cyber attacks and defenses).
155. WEISS, supra note 145, at 6; see also Clancy, supra note 70.
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to preserve anonymity of the threat intelligence data, which should reduce
the concerns of reluctant FIs that fear public disclosure of their
vulnerability.156 However, the services offered by FS-ISAC lack the
clearly delineated liability protections, for which the private sector has
advocated, and therefore, the incentive for FIs to share threat
information.157
IV. COLLABORATIVE IMPERATIVE: THE NEED FOR SYMBIOSIS IN THE
CYBER ECOSYSTEM
Given their breadth of resources, crucial insight, and expertise,
FIs are in an optimal position to provide valuable cyber threat information
to the federal government that may aid mitigation of cyber attacks across
the nation.158 However, concerns regarding reputational damage,
regulatory enforcement actions, and civil liability risks often inhibit
private entities’ willingness to share sensitive threat information.159 Such
hesitation is largely due to the unique challenges faced by FIs in cyber
warfare that require they balance two separate, but very much intertwined
interests.160 On one hand, they have to focus on their business interest in
preventing cyber attackers from gaining access to valuable data or money
through the FI’s network.161 On the other hand, FIs must always consider
their duty to protect customer privacy and civil liberties.162 Striking a
balance between these intertwining interests has vexed Congress and the
executive branch for many years, and remains a controversial debate
156. Id. at 5 (listing “[p]ublic disclosure of a breach may cost an organization customers
and sales and affect its stock price” as one example of an economic incentive not to share
cyber threat information).
157. Carlson, supra note 13, at 17.
158. See Germano, supra note 16, at 2–3 (discussing the optimal position of the private
sector, i.e. FIs to engage in a collaborative information sharing relationship with the
government); see also Carlson, supra note 13, at 12 (“[R]eliance on others gives us in the
financial services sector a unique and critical role in the cyber landscape and requires
coordinated action for the most effective response.”).
159. See Germano, supra note 16, at 2–8 (discussing the “legal, pragmatic, cultural, and
competitive hurdles to effective cooperation that need to be addressed”); see also ALSTON &
BIRD, supra note 20, at 1; FISCHER & LOGAN, supra note 66, at 2.
160. See Petrasic, supra note 29 (“[B]anks are fighting a two-front war—preventing
cybercriminals from gaining access to funds and private data, and satisfying compliance and
regulatory requirements imposed by regulators and law enforcement.”).
161. Id.
162. See id. (noting that successful cyber threat defense strategies may be partially
impeded by a misalignment between the goals of the FI and their regulators or law
enforcement agencies).
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among privacy advocates and business leaders in the private sector.163
A.

The Call for Legislation

Over 100 cybersecurity bills have been introduced in Congress in
the past five years, most of which were largely unsuccessful.164 In 2014,
the National Cybersecurity Protection Act made official DHS’s alreadyexisting cybersecurity information sharing center, known as the National
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (the “Integration
Center”).165 The Integration Center, a creature of DHS, functions in
essentially the same voluntary manner as FS-ISAC, as it works closely
with private entities and the federal government to “analyze[]
cybersecurity and communications information, share[] timely and
actionable information, and coordinate[] response, mitigation and
recovery efforts.”166 Despite the partial leap forward afforded by the
2014 National Cybersecurity Protection Act, the law still lacked the
clearly defined liability protections advocated for by private entities.167
The financial sector continued to actively voice its desire for Congress to
delineate specific legal protections for private entities that wish to share
cyber threat information with one another and the federal government.168
In a letter to Senate leaders, various financial trade groups 169 expressed
163. See ALSTON & BIRD, supra note 20, at 1.
164. JAMES ARDEN BARNETT JR., RECENT TRENDS IN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: LEADING

LAWYERS ON BALANCING US NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS,
IN CYBER SECURITY: FIXING POLICY WITH NEW PRINCIPALS AND ORGANIZATION 3 (Aspatore
2014).
165. National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2014, H.R.
3696, 113th Cong. (2013–2014).
166. U.S. Comput. Emergency Readiness Team, National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.uscert.gov/nccic (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
167. See Joint Trades Letter Supporting S.754 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of
2015, CONSUMER BANKERS ASS’N. (Apr. 13, 2015), http://consumerbankers.com/cbaissues/comment-letters/joint-trades-letter-supporting-s754-cybersecurity-informationsharing-act (“The financial services industry is dedicated to improving our capacity to protect
customers and their sensitive information but as it stands today, our laws do not do enough to
foster information sharing and establish clear lines of communication with the various
government agencies responsible for cybersecurity.”).
168. Id.
169. Id. The trade groups include: American Bankers Association, American Financial
Services Association, American Insurance Association, The Clearing House, Consumer
Bankers Association, Credit Union National Association, Electronic Transactions
Association, Financial Services Forum, Financial Services Roundtable, Independent
Community Bankers of America, Investment Company Institute, NACHA-The Electronic
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this desire, explaining that such liability protections will foster more
proactive information sharing among the private sector and federal
government.170
On October 27, 2015, the Senate passed the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015 (“CISA”), which set forth a voluntary
framework for private entities and the federal government to share cyber
threat information.171 Although the financial sector as a whole
demonstrated overwhelming support for CISA, the Financial Services
Roundtable expressed very specific concerns about problematic language
found in Section 407, which addressed protecting critical infrastructures
that are at the greatest risk to cyber attack.172 If enacted, Section 407
would have essentially created duplicative regulatory oversight for large
financial service firms.173 Section 407 would have granted authority to
the Secretary of Homeland Security and the appropriate agency head to
conduct an assessment and develop a strategy that addresses each of the
“covered entities,” which may have encompassed large FIs.174 Further,
Section 407 would have granted the federal government the authority to
mandate reporting requirements by covered entities that would have
completely undermined the voluntary nature of the bill.175
FIs viewed the Senate’s passage of CISA as a major win.176 At
first blush, it seemed that a tough battle remained to reconcile the bill
with similar House-passed legislation earlier in 2015— HR. 1560 and

Payments Association, National Association of Federal Credit Unions National Association
of Mutual Insurance Companies, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America,
Securities Industry and the Financial Markets Association. Id.
170. Id. The letter stated in part, “[t]he financial services industry is dedicated to
improving our capacity to protect customers and their sensitive information but as it stands
today, our laws do not do enough to foster information sharing and establish clear lines of
communication with the various government agencies responsible for cybersecurity.” Id.
171. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015).
172. Press Release, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, FSR Applauds Senate’s Passage of CISA as
a Victory for Strengthening Defenses Against Cyber Attacks (Oct. 27, 2015),
http://fsroundtable.org/fsr-applauds-senates-passage-of-cisa-as-a-victory-for-strengtheningdefenses-against-cyber-attacks/.
173. Id.
174. See id. Covered entities are identified pursuant to Section 9(a) of Executive Order
13636, which identifies critical infrastructures “where a cybersecurity incident could
reasonably result in catastrophic regional or national effects on public health or safety,
economic security, or national security.” Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11739 (Feb.
12, 2013).
175. Press Release, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, supra note 172.
176. Id.
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H.R. 1731.177 In general, both CISA and the House-passed bills limited
the use of shared information to cybersecurity purposes.178 However, the
bills differed in respect to which entities are authorized to receive shared
cyber threat information, and the proposed standard of how much
personal information must be removed prior to sharing.179
Dissatisfied privacy and civil liberties advocates seemed to stand
as the final hurdle in ending the deadlock on cyber legislation.180 A failed
amendment to CISA proposed by Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), sought to
impose more stringent requirements for private companies to remove
sensitive customer information “to the extent feasible” before sharing
cyber threat indicators.181 If effectuated, this amendment would have
ignited the very legal uncertainty that CISA aims to prevent because the
qualifier “to the extent feasible” is entirely too subjective.182 Use of this
subjective language would have complicated and deterred information
sharing because lawyers, security professionals, and others would have
remained concerned over whether or not they have sufficiently removed
information, thus frustrating the central purpose of the bill.183

177. Alexei Alexis, Additional Hurdles Await Cybersecurity Legislation, BLOOMBERG:
TELECOM LAW REPORT (Oct. 28, 2015). The House bills were effectively merged by a House
resolution. PCNA is Title I and NCPAA is Title II. H.R.J. Res. 212, 114th Cong. (2015).
178. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, S. 754, 114th Cong. §102(4) (2015). “The
term ‘cybersecurity purpose’ means the purpose of protecting an information system or
information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system from a
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.” See also H.R.J. Res. 212, 114th Cong. (2015).
179. See Alexis, supra note 177 (“A key difference is that the House legislation would
allow companies to share data with multiple federal agencies, while the Senate version would
establish a single portal at the Department of Homeland Security for the purposes of sharing
information with the government.”).
180. Id.
181. See Kaveh Waddell, The 22 Amendments That Could Determine the Fate of the
Senate’s
Cybersecurity
Bill,
NAT’L
J.
(Aug.
26,
2015),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/50094/cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-cisaamendments.
182. See id. (quoting U.S. Chambers of Commerce senior director Matt Eggers in saying
that the “more restrictive definitions of threats and indicators could be stumbling blocks for
businesses that want to participate in the sharing program”; but see Greg Nojeim & Jadiza
Butler, Guide to Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act Amendments, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY
& TECHN. BLOG, (Oct. 23, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog/guide-to-cybersecurity-informationsharing-act-amendments/ (arguing that “the amendment also provides an appropriate degree
of flexibility for companies because it only requires them to remove unnecessary PII ‘to the
extent feasible’”).
183. See Waddell, supra note 181 (quoting Eggers, “businesses are constantly on the
lookout for vague or subjective language that eludes easy interpretation” and the “Wyden
Amendment falls into that trap”); see also Letter from Kenneth E. Bentsen, President & CEO,
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Frank Keating, President & CEO,
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Senators rejected the Wyden Amendment by a 41-55 margin.184
One expert argued that the relatively close vote inferred that there could
still be strong debate over the details of the bill in the reconciliation
process.185 However, less than two months later, a compromise bill was
signed into law by President Obama that contained much of the original
text of CISA, minus the problematic text identified by the Financial
Services Roundtable, and effectively ended the cyber legislation
stalemate.186
B.

Cybersecurity Act of 2015

On December 18, 2015, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (the
“Act”) was signed into law by President Obama as part of a $1.1 trillion
omnibus spending bill.187 The Act establishes a voluntary framework for
private entities and the federal government to share cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures, and delineates the specific liability
protections advocated for by the financial sector.188 This framework
differs from FS-ISAC in that it enables all industries to improve
cybersecurity defenses and more quickly detect and mitigate threats
across the nation.189 Under the Act, if an FI gets hit by a cyber attack and
immediately shares the threat information with the government, the
government can then simultaneously distribute warnings to other private
entities.190 Private entities operating in other critical infrastructures, such

American Bankers Association, & Tim Pawlenty, President & CEO, Financial Services
Roundtable,
to
Senate
Leadership
on
CISA
(Oct.
20,
2015),
http://www.aba.com/Advocacy/LetterstoCongress/Documents/JointTradesLetterToSenateLe
adershipCISA102015Final.pdf (advocating against the Wyden Amendment as it would create
“unnecessarily restrictive roadblocks to timely and effective sharing about cyber threats”).
184. Andy Greenberg & Yael Grauder, CISA Security Bill Passes Senate With Privacy
Flaws Unfixed, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/10/cisa-cybersecurityinformation-sharing-act-passes-senate-vote-with-privacy-flaws/.
185. See id. (quoting Robyn Greene, policy counsel for the Open Technology Institute at
New America Foundation, who specializes in issues concerning surveillance and
cybersecurity).
186. See Cybersecurity Act of 2015, H.R. 2029, 114th Cong. (2015) [hereinafter
“Cybersecurity Act”]; see also CADWALADER, supra note 20.
187. CADWALADER, supra note 20.
188. ALSTON & BIRD, supra note 20, at 1–2; see also CADWALADER, supra note 20.
189. See Jose Pagliery, Senate Overwhelmingly Passes Historic Cybersecurity Bill, CNN
MONEY (Oct. 30, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/27/technology/cisa-cybersecurityinformation-sharing-act/.
190. Id.
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as energy and utility services, may learn how to defend themselves from
a cyber attack that hit an FI, and vice versa, all within a matter of
minutes.191
The Act maintained its very straightforward voluntary nature, as
it lacks any official mandate on private entities to share threat data with
the federal government.192 Therefore, if private entities do not wish to
participate, they are by no means required to.193 And, even if they do
participate, sharing information with a non-federal entity does not create
a right or benefit to similar information by such non-federal entity in
return.194 The Act clarifies a number of critical aspects of the competing
bills—namely, where in the government information sharing can occur,
clear delineation of liability protections, and forthcoming guidelines on
the standard by which personal information must be removed prior to
sharing.195 Section 102 of the Act provides definitions of recurring key
terms such as: cyber threat indicator, defensive measure, cybersecurity
purpose, and appropriate federal entities.196
1. Extent of Government Authorization to Receive and Disseminate
Cyber Threat Information
The Act designates a single information portal197 at DHS that
authorizes an automatic forward of information to other “appropriate
Federal entities”198 after the required steps have been taken to scrub
personal information from the data.199 Prior to the passage of the Act, the
White House Administration advocated utilization of a single portal for
receiving and disseminating threat information because the associated

191. See id. (“Every cyber attack is like a flu virus, and CISA is intended to be a lightningfast distribution system for the flu vaccine. Opt in, and you get a government shot in minutes,
not months.”).
192. Cybersecurity Act, § 108(i).
193. See id. (noting further that there is no liability for non-participation).
194. Id. § 104(f).
195. See id. §§ 102–106.
196. Id. at § 102.
197. See infra note 165. This information portal is the Integration Center made official
by the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014. Id.
198. Appropriate federal entities include the Departments of Commerce, Defense,
Energy, Justice, and the Treasury, as well as the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence. Cybersecurity Act § 102(3).
199. See id. § 103 (sharing of information by the federal government).
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efficiencies will ensure real-time sharing.200 Centralized sharing will
enhance situational awareness and further facilitate robust privacy
controls through active oversight of information sharing.201
The federal government is limited in its ability to disclose, retain,
and use cybersecurity information acquired through the sharing portal.202
The Act generally limits the use of shared information to a “cybersecurity
purpose”, which is defined as the “purpose of protecting information
systems or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an
information system from a cybersecurity threat or security
vulnerability.”203 Additionally, the Act exempts disclosure of shared
information under the Freedom of Information Act.204
Cyber threat indicators and defensive measures may also be
disclosed to, retained, or used by the federal government to identify a
cybersecurity threat, including the source of such cybersecurity threat or
a security vulnerability.205 Information shared with the federal
government under the Act may be used in certain other law enforcement
investigations, but only in limited circumstances such as those that relate
to preventing or mitigating specific threats of death, bodily harm, and
serious economic harm.206 Information relating to threats of death and
bodily harm are relatively straightforward and will likely function as a
very narrow, and easily definable exception category.207 Specific threats
of “economic harm” may be harder to categorize, and thus may operate
as a more flexible exception.208
2. Privacy Concerns
The Act includes multiple layers of privacy protections that
function to prevent inappropriate sharing of sensitive, personally

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Alexis, supra note 177.
Id.
CADWALADER, supra note 20.
Cybersecurity Act §102(4).
See id. § 105(d); see also CADWALADER, supra note 20.
Cybersecurity Act § 105(d)(5).
See id. § 105(d)(5).
Paul Rosenzweig, The Cybersecurity Act of 2015, LAWFARE BLOG (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/cybersecurity-act-2015.
208. See id. (“The [economic harm category] seems to [be] more capacious and capable
of ‘expansion’ but still a cabining of some sort.”).
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identifiable information.209 First, the Act explicitly requires private
entities to remove information that they “know[] at the time of sharing”
to contain sensitive, personally identifiable information.210 The Act’s
narrow definition of what constitutes a “cyber threat indicator” also
provides a “key privacy protection in the Act because it creates an
exhaustive list of the types of cyber threat information that can be
shared.”211 Cyber threat indicators focus on the techniques and malware
used by cybercriminals, rather than actual personal information contained
in the affected network.212 The narrow definition limits the sharing of
sensitive customer information to the extent necessary to describe the
threat.213
The duty to protect personal information from unauthorized use
or disclosure through cyber threat information sharing is two-fold, as it
applies equally to federal entities.214 The federal government’s duty to
safeguard the privacy and civil liberties of persons whose information is
shared under the Act extends beyond what is required by private
entities.215 The Act specifically requires the federal government to notify
persons whose personal information is shared by a federal entity in
violation of the Act.216 Furthermore, the Act calls for sanctions to be
developed and implemented against “officers, employees, or agents of a
Federal entity who knowingly and willfully conduct activities under this
title in an unauthorized manner.”217
The Act calls for the Attorney General, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the heads of the appropriate
federal entities, as well as other designated officers, to develop final
guidelines relating to privacy and civil liberties.218 The final guidelines
will govern the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of cyber threat

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

ALSTON & BIRD, supra note 20, at 3–4.
Cybersecurity Act § 104(d).
S. REP. NO. 114-32, at 3–4 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Cybersecurity Act § 105(d)(5)(c).
See ALSTON & BIRD, supra note 20, at 3 (noting the requirement for the government
to “notify individuals whose personal information is shared by a federal entity in violation of
the statute”).
216. Cybersecurity Act § 103(b)(1)(F); ALSTON & BIRD, supra note 20, at 3.
217. Cybersecurity Act § 103(a)(3)(C).
218. Cybersecurity Act § 105(b). Interim guidelines will be released within 60 days of
the Act, and the final guidelines will be available within 180 days. Id.
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indications acquired by a federal entity under the Act.219 Numerous
requirements for the final guidelines are listed in the Act limiting the
effect on privacy and civil liberties.220 The final guidelines must also
include a designated process for the destruction of any shared information
that is known to not be directly related to cybersecurity purposes, and
requires specific limitations on the length of any period in which a cyber
threat indicator may be retained by a Federal entity. 221
3. Liability Protections
The Act clearly defines liability protections for private entities
who choose to share cyber threat information with one another or the
federal government.222 These protections seek to incentivize information
sharing to improve cyber threat detection and shorten the lifespan of
active threats.223 However, the extent of this liability protection is very
narrowly tailored, and must remain in accordance with the similar terms
set forth by the Act.224
To qualify for liability protections under the Act, any information
shared must be for cybersecurity purposes only.225 Section 106 outlines
such liability protections, establishing that “[n]o cause of action shall lie
or be maintained in any court against any private entity” for the
monitoring and sharing of cyber threat indicators or defensive measures
authorized by Section 104.226 Section 106(c) also reiterates the voluntary
nature of the Act, clarifying that nothing in the Act shall be construed to
“create a duty to share a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure; nor
a duty to warn or act based on the receipt of a cyber threat indicator or
defensive measure.”227 Further, the protection afforded by the Act does
not include unauthorized monitoring or sharing, including gross
negligence or willful misconduct that puts sensitive data at risk of being

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. § 105(b)(2).
See id. § 105(b)(3).
Id. § 105(b)(3)(B).
Id. §106(b).
See S. REP. NO. 114-32, at 3 (2015); see also ALSTON & BIRD, supra note 20, at 1.
Cybersecurity Act, supra note 186, § 106(b)(1).
Id. § 106(b).
Id.
Id. § 106(c).
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compromised.228
Although the Act provides clear liability protections to private
entities who wish to share cyber threat information, such entities are still
encouraged to consult their legal counsel.229 The Act was broadly drafted
to authorize sharing of information “notwithstanding any other provision
of law” for cybersecurity purposes that are consistent with the protection
of classified information.230
However, entities must still share
information in accordance with the forthcoming guidelines that will
govern the receipt, retention, use and dissemination of cyber threat
information.231 The Act’s provisions will be reconciled with other laws
and regulations that govern the access and use of sensitive personal
information.232 Although there is no clear answer to how the Act will
interact with existing laws, the Act’s exception to antitrust liability may
serve as a useful lens to examine other similar concerns.
In the past, antitrust issues may have functioned as a deterrent for
institutions to share technical cyber threat information with others in the
industry.233 Institutions feared that sharing cyber threat information with
others in the industry would subject them to liability under anti-trust laws
that seek to limit information sharing among competitors for other
purposes.234 The Act codified an earlier premise set forth in a joint
statement released by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and
the Federal Trade Commission in April of 2014, which made it quite clear
they do not believe that antitrust issues should be a roadblock to
legitimate cybersecurity information sharing.235
The Agencies
differentiated cyber threat information from sensitive information that
relates to any particular business’ plans or pricing information.236 The
Act clearly limits the scope of liability protection offered to private
entities that share information with one another to cybersecurity purposes
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See id.; see also S. REP. NO. 114-32 at 3.
CADWALADER, supra note 20.
Cybersecurity Act § 104(c)(1).
Id. § 105(b).
CADWALADER, supra note 20.
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM., ANTITRUST POLICY STATEMENT ON
SHARING
OF
CYBERSECURITY
INFORMATION
1,
5
(Apr.
10,
2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/297681/140410ftcdojcyberth
reatstmt.pdf; see also WEISS, supra note 145, at 4.
234. See WEISS, supra note 145, at 4.
235. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM., supra note 233, at 1–2.
236. See id. at 1–4.
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only.237 Thus, the antitrust exemption does not seek to protect private
entities from “engaging in anti-competitive behavior under the guise of
cybersecurity.”238
C.

Remaining Concerns

The mixed response to the passage of the Act mirrors the
controversy that contributed to the lengthy stalemate in cybersecurity
legislation.239 The debate boils down to striking a mutually satisfying
balance between the two competing interests any private entity faces in
dealing with cybersecurity—protecting privacy and civil liberties, versus
protecting business interests that may be compromised by a successful
cyber attack.240 Opponents of the Act believe customer privacy and civil
liberties are compromised by the proposed information sharing
authorization standard, and that the legislation essentially functions as a
surveillance bill.241 Privacy advocates such as Senator Ron Wyden (DOR) have publicly denounced the Act, stating that it is extremely flawed
and “would ‘seriously threaten privacy and civil liberties, and could
undermine cybersecurity, rather than enhance it.’” 242 A handful of
lawmakers voted against the omnibus spending bill, solely because it
included the Cybersecurity Act.243
Those in favor of the Act believe privacy protections are
sufficiently addressed, and any deficiencies may only be realized through
utilization of the processes authorized by Act.244 Furthermore, the Act is
a much needed step in the direction of successful cybersecurity defense

237. See Cybersecurity Act § 104(e).
238. See id.; see also S. REP. NO. 114-32 8 (2015).
239. See Cory Bennett, Lawmakers to Oppose Spending Bill Over Cyber Language, THE

HILL (Dec. 16, 2015, 7:04 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/263537-cyber-billspurs-several-no-votes-on-omnibus (discussing the debate over adequately addressing
privacy concerns).
240. See Petrasic, supra note 29; see also Waddell, supra note 181.
241. See Everett Rosenfeld, The Controversial “Surveillance” Act Obama Just Signed,
CBNC (Dec. 22, 2015, 12:34 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/22/the-controversialsurveillance-act-obama-just-signed.html.
242. Id.
243. Bennett, supra note 239; see also Rosenfeld, supra note 241 (quoting California Rep.
Zoe Lofgren and Senator Wyden voting against the bill because it functions as a surveillance
tool).
244. See Greenberg & Grauder, supra note 184 (quoting Senate Intelligence Committee
Chair, Richard Burr (R-NC)).
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and threat mitigation for FIs and the nation as a whole.245 Senator Diane
Feinstein (D-CA) referred to the Act as “an important first step to address
a significant drain on our economy and threat to our national security.” 246
The Act was designed to combat perceived barriers to collaboration in
cyber-warfare, and accordingly incentivize, but not require, information
sharing among the private sector and government.247
Aside from the privacy debate, some have raised concerns over
the quiet means by which the Act was inaugurated.248 Open Technology
Institutes policy counsel, Robyn Greene referred to the Act’s place in the
federal budget as “pulling a second Patriot Act,” given that this bill has
been “kicked around for years and ha[s] been too controversial to pass,
so they’ve seen an opportunity to push it through without debate.”249
The actual degree to which the Act increases information sharing
and aids in threat mitigation remains to be seen.250 Section 207 of the Act
requires the Comptroller General of the United States to submit an
assessment of the implementation of the Act, and to a reasonable extent,
any findings regarding increases in the sharing of cyber threat indicators,
defensive measures, and information related to cybersecurity risks and
incidents at the Integration Center.251 The Comptroller’s assessment is
due within two years after the date of the enactment of the Act.252 In the
meantime, private entities should recognize that although critical to threat
mitigation, information sharing is only one of many facets of
cybersecurity.253 Various unilateral measures are still necessary to take
and maintain in order to develop an effective cybersecurity defense
program.254

245. Rosenfeld, supra note 241.
246. Brandom, supra note 21; see also Rosenfeld, supra note 241 (quoting U.S. Chamber

of Commerce President and CEO, Thomas Donahue, saying that the Act is “our best chance
yet to help address this economic and national security priority in a meaningful way and help
prevent future attacks”).
247. CADWALADER, supra note 20.
248. See Rosenfeld, supra note 241 (referring to the Act as a “second Patriot Act”).
249. Andy Greenberg, Congress Slips CISA Into a Budget Bill That’s Sure to Pass, WIRED
(Dec. 16, 2015, 12:24 PM).
250. FISCHER & LOGAN, supra note 66, at 4.
251. Cybersecurity Act § 207.
252. Id.
253. See Susan Hennessey, The Problems CISA Solves: ECPA Reform in Disguise,
LAWFARE (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/problems-cisa-solves-ecpareform-disguise.
254. See id. (“Effective cybersecurity includes network monitoring, scanning, and deep-
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V. CONCLUSION
In light of the pervasive threat of increasingly sophisticated cyber
attacks, FIs must continuously revamp, maintain, and adapt their
cybersecurity infrastructures.255 Modern cybersecurity defense requires
FIs to focus less on network security and more on the data.256 This focus
necessitates a better, more collaborative relationship between FIs and the
government.257 The benefits of information sharing are quite clear, and
any increase in such sharing is likely to have more positive effects on
threat mitigation than negative implications feared by privacy
advocates.258 Sharing cyber threat information enables the government
to analyze trends and data in a comprehensive cyber threat information
database, which puts both the private sector and the federal government
in a better position to mitigate and defend against cyber attacks.259
However, information sharing is most relevant to imminent threats rather
than broader issues in cybersecurity that may be addressed through
individually tailored cybersecurity programs.260 FIs must continue to
spend time, money, and resources to address the growing threat of cyber
attacks on an institutional basis alongside any efforts to contribute to the
collaborative information sharing initiative.261
The famous words, “united we stand, divided we fall” ring as true
in cyber warfare as they did in the Revolutionary War. 262 The critical
packet inspection. . . [which] includes contents of communications in order to detect malicious
activity. Federal and state laws create major impediments to that activity. [The Act] is
designed to begin fixing this.”).
255. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 33 (“Given the sheer number
and continual morphing of assaults . . . we have to increasingly focus our efforts on making
response and recovery more efficient, effective, and predictable.”).
256. See Clancy, supra note 69 (noting that as information sharing and analysis increases,
“the process of detection and mitigation will become more efficient and the balance of power
will shift away from the criminals”).
257. See Germano, supra note 16, at 2 (“Accordingly, because significant access,
expertise, and perspective needed to address the cyberthreat reside in both the private and
public sectors, . . . collaboration is essential to attain feasible and effective cybersecurity
solutions.”).
258. See Rosenfeld, supra note 241.
259. V. Gerard Comizio, Information Sharing is Key to Avoid a Cyber Attack, TECH
CRUNCH (Nov. 15, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/11/15/information-sharing-is-key-toavoiding-a-cyberattack/#.
260. See id; see also FISCHER & LOGAN, supra note 66, at 4.
261. See FISCHER & LOGAN, supra note 66, at 4.
262. History of the Motto, Smithsonian National Museum of American History,

http://amhistory.si.edu/1942/campaign/campaign24.html (last visited Feb. 17,
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infrastructures of the United States are more technologically integrated
than ever before, which amplifies the potential for cyber attacks.263
Therefore, to lessen the vulnerability of such infrastructures, FIs must
take measures to protect their own networks, and aid in the mitigation of
threats to others through collaborative information sharing.264
ARIANA L. JOHNSON

2016). In 1768, founding father John Dickinson coined this patriotic motto in the Liberty
Song that encompassed collaboration as a central theme.
263. Comizio, supra note 259; see also White House Office of the Press Secretary, supra
note 21.
264. Comizio, supra note 259; see also Hennessey, supra note 253 (“[The Act] comes at
a cybersecurity crisis point. The principal solutions to the crisis all require that private
industry do more to protect the personal data in its possession and under its control.”).

